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LIFE AND DEATH IN AN OIL BOOM
Oscar Salazar Rodriguez
ABSTRACT
The local communities will do better to consider oil booms unpre-
dictable. For local planning in anticipation of an oil boom can be a
very risky proposition. Unlike other forms of energy resource devlop-
ment, petroleum development can be a highly random and mobile process.
The sites of operation are not really known until after exploration and
extraction activities are already in their advanced stages. The center
or concentration of these activities shifts from one cluster of newly
discovered oilfields to another. Other than the petroleum itself, all
other factors figure very little into the oil industry's location
and production function. Thus as wildcatters, pipeliners and roustabouts
move from one "completed" field to anew field, so too the epicenter of
the boom will move from one area to another. A local community that
invests heavily in public capital in the hopes of averting the shortages
and crowding conditions associated with boom-type growth, may a sadly find
later that their investments were made in vane. Depending upon where
they are located with respect to the natural distribution of petroleum
deposits and to where the oil industry happens to strike oil, local
communities can either (1) boom then bust after a short period of time, or
(2) boom indefinately without interruption, or (3) not boom at all.
Much of the present literature on boomtowns discounts this element
of uncertainty in planning. They focus instead on resource allocation in
preparation of the boom. That is, they assume that the boom is coming
and try to accomodate it in the most efficient way possible. This
approach to planning in boomtowns derives from the experience with mining
and construction projects. As such, it is not very helpful to the
planner working in an oil boomtown.
Looking back now at the oil boom that occurred in the Permian Basin
during the 1920's, it is evident that its outcome could not have been
predicted. Population settlement and economic growth cannot be explained
by what seem to be the most rational and economically outstanding motiva-
tions or factors. The towns that boomed the most were neither the most
established, nor the significant centers of economic agglomeration, nor
even the most endowed with petroleum deposits. Midland-Odessa, the
growth center that emerged in the oil boom, could not have been identified
as a likely boomtown even ten years into the boom. Big Spring and Wink,
on the otherhand, were likely candidates, and they did boom at first, but
by the 1940's they stopped growing and even lost population.
Thesis Advisors: Karen Polenske
Ron Trosper
Lisa Peattie
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7INTRODUCTION
A regional oil boom is by the very nature of the resource base highly
unpredictable. Unlike the development of other types of energy resources,
petroleum development covers a vast areas, and its sites of operation are
not known until after extraction activities are already in their advanced
stages. Faced with this uncertainty, the workforce who arrive to take
up the jobs created by the oil boom are forced to make their settlement
decisions almost completely in the dark. Moreover, neither the state of
the local economy nor the location of labor markets figure into the
petroleum industry's production function nearly as significantly as the
location of the crude itself. As a result, the distribution of population
occurs so much at random that the planner is unable to trace any out-
standing factor which serves to explain and, therefore, anticipate where
growth will or will not be seen.
The current aim in much of the literature on boomtowns is that of
developing efficient resource allocation schemes which anticipate the
quantity and quality of the eminent increase in demand for public capital
stock by in-migrating workers. But this approach may not apply to oil
boomtowns. Much of the research on which these models have been based has
taken place around job booms brought on by coal mining or the construction
of large power stations in the West. Mining and construction operations
are localized and fixed. That is, they occur in one precise place, and
they become with a difinite time-table for completion. Thus, the type of
policy that might be appropriate under these conditions is inappropriate
in the case of an oil boom. Some communities will make good use of the
8new infrastructure during the boom, but others will either not see a
boom at all or they will only experience a few years of growth followed
by a final bust. The no-growth communities who overcapitalize stand to
lose twice in the boom. They will have to absorb not only the repre-
cussions of their squandered investments, but also whatever social and
eocnomic problems the boom leaves behind when it has subsided in the
region, such as social disruptions, flight of the community's work-
force to the oil industry from traditional jobs, and environment
change.
9ABOUT THE PAPER
The Thesis
The thesis presented here is twofold. It argues that (1) local
economic growth in an oil boom cannot be projected on the basis of
industrial location nor on the ability of the local economy to service
the oil industry and the incoming workforce, and (2) that for the most
part one cannot predict the outcome an oil boom. To make this argument,
four types of hypothetical scenarios of economic development and pop-
ulation settlement in the Permian Basin will be analyzed:
1. droves of incoming workers ascending on the region
and settling in the established towns and cities;
2. the emerging oil economy running into bottlenecks, and
key actors in the economy queing up in the only two
or three town that have the sought-after services;
3. the boom reworking the spatial organization of the
regional economy, with growth and settlement con-
centrating in the regional crossroads and in the
communities located closest to the most active oil-
fields;
4. the centers of production and growth being known
beforehand through the information collected by
oil prospectors.
The aim here is to show that the outcome of the boom could not have been
anticipated: that the actual outcome of the oil boom in the Permian Basin
contradicts all four of the scenarios above.
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Area of Study
The scope of the paper will focus on twenty-one counties in West Texas.:
1. Andrews 12. Midland
2. Borden 13. Mitchell
3. Crane 14. Pecos
4. Crockett 15. Reagan
5. Dawson 16. Reeves
6. Ector 17. Scurry
7. Gaines 18. Sterling
8. Glasscock 19. Upton
9. Howard 20. Ward
10. Loving 21. Winkler
11. Martin
(see Maps I, II)
The region covered by the aggregate surface area of these counties will
be referred to as the Permian Basin. The term permian basin describes a
geological formation -- an ancient sea -- buried far beneath the surface of
West Texas and Southeastern New Mexico. In strictly formal terms, it can
be said that the Permian Basin actually extends over a greater area than
that covered by the twenty-one counties in this study. However, the Per-
mian Basin is significant in real life only because many reserves of oil
and gas have been found within its formations. Given this, the Permian
Basin is a smaller, more discreet place. It is therefore proper to think
of it as that region of West Texas and Southeastern New Mexico circum-
scribed by major oil-producing counties. The twenty-one counties listed
above encompass this petroleum-rich region in its past and present produc-
11
Map I: Counties of Permian Basin
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Map II: Southeastern, New Mexico,
Texas and Oklahoma
Source: National Geographic
Atlas
Compiled and Drawn in the Cartoraphic Division of
The National Geographic Society
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tion status (See Exhibit AB, and C in Appendix).
The Time Period
The time frame for this study will begin circa 1921 when oil was
first struck, and it will end in the mid-1940',s when Midland City and
Odessa had surged ahead of all the other communities in the region to be-
come the dominant population centers (see Map III). The assumption here
is that at the beginning of the boom, it was not apparent that Midland
City and Odessa would grow as rapidly as they did, but that by the mid-
1940's their prominence in the region was clear. While the rationale for
the bottom time-boundary of the boom (1921) is obvious, the upper boundary
(1945) may be less clear. In actuality, the Permian Basin has seen more
than one oil boom. Presently it can be said that the Permian Basin is in
the midst of at least its third economic peak in terms of oilfield activity
rate of increase in region population. .Based on different variables,
the case can be made that the Permian Basin in the 1940's had gone throuqh
more than one boom, or that it has not yet passed its first boom. But
based on the change in population for both Ector and Midland as compared
to the Permian Basin as a whole, it can be seen that a very significant
demographic milestone had been reached by 1950 (See Tables 1,11,111). What-
ever happened after the 1940's would have been superfluous to the planner
trying to predict the direction of the boom. The fact by then was already
established that the boom had come and that Midland-Odessa would be the
largest growth center in the region (see Diagram I, II).
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Map III: Cities and Towns
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TABLE I: County Populations 1920-1980
Y'20 Y'30 Y'40 Y50 Y'60 Y'70 Y'80
Andrews 350 736 1277 5002 13450 10372 13284
Borden 965 1505 1396 1106 1076 888 857
Crane 37 2221 2841 3965 4692 4172 4597
Crockett 1500 2590 2809 3981 4209 3885 4588
Dawson 4309 13573 15367 19113 19185 16604 16194
Ector 760 3958 15051 42102 90995 92660 115204
Gaines 1018 2800 8136 8909 12267 11593 13199
Glasscock 555 1263 1193 1089 1118 1155 1308
Howard 6962 22888 20990 26772 40139 37796 33286
Loving 82 195 285 227 226 164 91
Martin 1146 5785 5556 5541 5068 4774 4705
Midland 2449 8005 11721 25785 67717 65433 82311
Mitchell 7527 14183 12477 14357 11255 9073 9082
Pecos 3857 7812 8185 9939 11957 13748 14641 Cn
Reagan 377 3028 1997 3127 3782 3239 4126
Reeves 4457 6407 8006 11745 17644 16526 15788
Scurry 9003 12188 11545 22779 20369 15760 18176
Sterling 1053 1431 1404 -1282 1177 1056 1209
Upton 253 5968 4297 5307 6239 4697 4645
Ward 2615 4599 9575 13346 14917 13019 14024
Winkler 81 6784 6141 10064 13652 9640 9961
Total 49356 127919 150249 235488 361134 336254 381276
Mean 2350 6091 7155 11213 17197 16012 18156
Median 1053 4599 6141 8909 11957 9640 9961
Standard
deviation 2685 5620 5734 11009 22905 22995 28394
Source: U.S. Census of Population
Population Rates of Change, 1910-1980 for Counties
Y'20 Y'30 Y'40 Y'50 "Y'60 Y 70 Y'80
Andrews -64.103 110.286 73,505 291,699 168,892 -22.885 28.076
Borden -30.375 55.959 -7.243 -20,774 -2,712 -17,472 -3.491
Crane -88.822 5902.703 27.915 39.564 18.335 -11.083 10.187
Crockett 15.741 72.667 8,456 41,723 5,727 -7,698 18.095
Dawson 85.733 214.992 13,217 24,377 0,377 -13,453 -2.469
Ector -35.484 420.789 280.268 179.729 116.130 1.830 24.330
Gaines -18.884 175.049 190.571 9.501 37.692 -5.494 13.853
Glasscock -51.444 127,568 -5,542 -8,718 2.663 3.309 13.247
Howard -21.603 228.756 -8.293 27,308 50.210 -5.837 -11.932
Loving -67.063 137.805 46.154 -20.351 -0.441 -27.434 -44.512
Martin -26.017 404.799 -3.959 -0.270 -8.536 -5.801 -1.445
Midland -29.301 226.868 46.421 119.990 162.622 -3.373 25.794
Mitchell -15.956 88.428 -12.028 15.068 -21.606 -19.387 0.099
Pecos 86.239 102.541 4.775 21.429 20.304 14.979 6.495
Reagan -3.827 703.183 -34.049 56.585 20.947 -14.357 27.385
Reeves 1.480 43.751 24.957 46.702 50.226 -6.336 -4.466
Scurry -17.585 35.677 -5.276 97.306 -10.580 -22.628 15.330
Sterling -29.471 35.897 -1.887 -8.689 -8.190 -10.280 14.489
Upton -49.501 2258.893 -27.999 23.505 17.562 -24.715 -1.107
Ward 9.460 75.870 108.197 39.384 11.771 -12.724 7.719
Winkler -81.674 8275.309 -9.478 -60.110 ..30.665 -29.388 3,330
Region
Mean 20.594 937.98 33.747 42.495 86.404 -11.439 6.619
Median -26.017 137.8 4.8 24.4 17.56 -11.1 717.0
Standard
deviation 44.982 2133.658 76.287 78.764 256.927 11.002 16.427
Source: U.S. Census of Population.
TABLE II:
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DIAGRAM I: County Population Growth
1920-1960
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DIAGRAM II: Municipal Population Growth
1920-1980
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TABLE III: Municipalities 1920-1980
Municipality County 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Abilene
Lubbock
San Angelo
Andrews (Andrews)
Barstow (Ward)
Big Lake (Reagan)
Big Spring (Howard)
Coahoma (Howard)
Colorado City (Mitchell)
Crane (Crane)
Fort Stockton (Pecos)
Grandfalls (Ward)
Iraan (Pecos)
Kermit (Winkler)
Lamesa (Dawson)
McKamey (Upton)
Midland (Midland)
Monahans (Ward)
Odessa (Ector)
Ozona (Crockett)
Pecos (Reeves)
Pyote (Ward)
Rankin (Upton)
Seagraves (Gaines)
Seminole (Gaines)
Snyder (Scurry)
Stanton (Martin
Sterling City (Sterling)
Wink (Winkler)
10,274
4,051
10,050
U
U
U
4,273
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
1,188
U
1,795
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
2,179
U
U
U
23,175
20,520
25,308
U
U
U
13,735
U
4,671
U
2,695
U
U
U
3,528
3,446
5,484
U
2,407
U
3,304
1,907
U
U
U
3,008
1,384
U
3,963
U--unorganized
Source: U.S. Census of Population.
26
31
25
,612
,853
,802
45,570
71,747
52,093
3,294
683
2,152
17,286
802
6,774
2,154
4,444
915
1,196
6,912
10,704
3,121
21,713
6,311
29,495
2,885
8,054
U
1,139
2,101
3,479
12,010
1,603
U
1,521
90,368
128,691
58,815
11,135
707
2,668
31,230
1,239
6,457
3,796
6,373
1,012
1,255
10,465
12,438
3,375
62,625
8,567
80,338
3,361
12,728
420
1,214
2,307
5,737
13,850
2,228
854
1,863
611
558
763
12,604
574
5,213
1,420
1,295
653
U
2,584
6,038
2,595
9,352
3,944
9,573
U
4,855
U
672
3,225
1,761
3,815
1,245
U
1,945
89,653
149,101
63,884
8,625
614
2,489
28,735
1,156
5,227
3,427
8,283
622
996
7,884
11,590
2,647
59,463
8,333
78,380
2,864
12,682
155
1,105
2,440
5,007
11,171
2,117
780
1,023
98,315
179,379
73,240
11,061
637
3,404
24,804
1,069
5,405
3,622
8,688
635
1,358
8,015
11,798
2,436
70,525
8,397
89,797
3,766
12,844
382
1,216
2,596
6,080
12,671
2,314
915
1,182
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MODEL BOOMS
The boomtown phenomenon is an increasingly popular topic of discus-
sion in the energy resource-rich lands of western North America. From
the Prudhoe Bay to the Bay of Campeche, Federal policy analysts and local
officials are having to wrestle with the impacts that energy resource
development is landing on the communities located in the vicinity of these
resources. Uncertainty is one of the most foreboding hinderences to
planning in these boomtowns. Attempts are being made to cross this
barrier by modeling boomtown development. However, after having started
out in a very pricise fashion, boomtown modeling has evolved into a very
general and imprecise area of research. All boomtowns are assumed to
have pointed growth curves and to undergo the same general process of
economic development. But what is most disturbing about this movement in
the study of boomtowns is its gross negligence of uncertainty. Once the
impacts of energy development are eminent, local communities are thought
to be set irreversably on the road to typical boomtown development.
Commings et al. have ppblished a plan for "optimal municipal invest-
ment in boom towns, whereby the taxpayers of a boomtown trade off a frac-
tion of their wages for a corresponding increase in per capita stock in
public infrastructure.7. The benefits of alternative levels of infra-
structure are measured according to a definite pricing scheme based on a
survey of worker's perferences. The goal here is, at least in theory, to
keep the individual worker at the level of per capita infrastructure that
he or she is willing to accept in the way of less take-home pay. While
allowing for different tenures of residency in the municipality. For the
21
natives, Cummings discounts the cost of having to put up with crowding
during the peak period of the boom against the benefit of not having
to maintain an oversized stock of infrastructure after the peak when
wages and population size begin to decline. From the side of the incom-
ing worker-consumers, the inconvenience of crowded municipal infra-
structure is put off through less take home pay. The result of all this
is a market-oriented resource allocation scheme that attempts to bridge
the impasses between the boom-bust nature of energy boomtowns and the
long-term obligations of public infrastructure.
The Cummings approach to municipal investment is, of course, only
one of the many approaches to the matter. The case has been made for the
employment of other allocative strategies than pricing, such as rationing
or the establishment of minimum consumption levels (or alternatively of
maximum tax levels).
Susskind and O'Hare have proposed a different way of approaching
the conflicts between energy development and planning in the impacted
local communities.8 Based upon the experience of energy boomtowns in
Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota and Texas, Susskind and O'Hare developed
an auctioning concept for site location in energy development. They
argue that since the costs and benefits associated with a given location
decision accrue differently to the different parties touched by the pro-
ject, the decision making process should allow for greater participation
from all the concerned parties (e.g. industry, private individuals, local
government, stae and federal government, etc.). Once at the negotiating
table, the interested actors are encouraged to review each others' costs
and benefits and bid on the site of the project with the understanding
22
that certain conditions and bonuses are to be demanded of the project
where ever it is finally based. In this way wherever the- project goes,
the impacts will be easier to mitigate and society will spend fewer
resources to compensate the local community for the local externalties
of the project.
It is hard to see how the Cummings or the Susskind approach to the
boomtown phenomenon is applicable to oil booms. With mining and plant
construction booms the matter of undercertainty really only involves
matching the appropriate lump-sum capital stock to the.needs of a fair-
weathered population. In other words, the task for the planner in these
types of boomtowns is to smoothen out the peaks of rapid growth by
accommodating the boom in the most efficient way possible. In oil booms,
however, the point of impact is uncertain and too broad to prepare for
before the actual fact. Although oil has been found in the immediate
area oaa given community, it cannot be known until after enough time has
passed where or if alot of oil and, therefore, a lot of jobs will be
found in the vincinity. The planner in a given boom does not have
beforehand enough information to say when, how much, of if in fact rapid
growth will occur. Thus, in an oil boomtown the uncertainty lies not
only in how to allocate resources to meet the needs of the boom, but
rather whether or not a boom will actually materilize--where not to
spend resources.
Another question that haunts planners in a boomtown concerns the
type of quality of demand, once it has been determined that a boom is
upon the region. Most of the work being done on this question has been
carried out though the refinement of projection models. The Los Alamos
23
Scientific Laboratory was pioneer in this area in 1976 they constructed
the BOOM I MODEL. The researchers here made no mistake of specifying
where their model was to be applied.
The model, titled Boom 1, simulates the socio-economic
development of small towns affected by the construction
and operation of large-scale energy facilities....
The model can be used to test the effectiveness of a
broad range of policies designed to alleviate the
adverse condition that can accompany the con truction
of large energy facilities near small towns.
After Boom 1 was published, other models began to proliferate which
expanded the domain of boom projection. Keeping in touch with the policy
of energy resource diversification of the Carter Administration, the boom
modelling that followed was aimed at the general boomtown case instead of
the specific case of energy plant construction. The Argonne National
Laboratory offers a model which greatly increases the scope of Boom 1, the
Social and Economic Assessment Model (SEAM):
The data and models of SEAM can be used to evaluate the
social and economic effects of energy or industrial
development on any county, communities within
counties, or combination of counties in the continental
United States. 0
Within this model are contained several submodels which project the
different aspects of the boom in question. For example, the Spatial
Allocation Model (SAM) simulates the settlement preferences of the incom-
ing workforce.
The allocation model is used in specialized applications
of SEAM when detailed information on housing demands and
settlements patterns of in-migrating workers is required
at the community level. SAM projects the manner in which
new residents will distribute themselves among the
communities within communting distance of the site and
computes the housing need of these new residents at each
location....
24
The Spatial allocation model is preference-maximizing,
income constrained linear programming system for
determining how different segments of the in-migrating
population will istribute themselves within the
affected county.
It can be inferred from this, boomtowns are but a single family of rapid
growth and the political and economic features of development in one boom
are taken to be governed by the same principles and dynamics that form
all boomtowns. Supposedly, only the actors, skills, and energy products
change. Given better information concerning the labor market that is
required by the given energy industry, and the character of the existing
infrastructure and economy, the outcome of the boom can be anticipated
more accurately. Most recently, Tischelr, Montasser and Associates,
Inc., have begun to market and impact projection model which serves not
only the needs of government planners but also private business as well,
the Social and Economic Impact Assessment Model (SEIA):
The SEIA forecasts the impacts of a projected plant
on a large number of parameters which characterize
the region (e.g. population and employment levels
infrastructure, human needs, and governmental
services and finances). On the basis of the SEIA
and analyses of other considerations, a specific
proposal may be evaluated. The evaluation may suggest
the plan is acceptable or it may ilead to the consider-
ation of alternative. {e alternative then becomes
a subject for analysis.
Centaur Management Consultants, Inc., outlines all energy development
according to the following phases: 13
.exploration
.site preparation
.extration/development/mining
.preparation/processing/conservation
.transportation
.reclamation
.power generation
.transmission
.distribution
25
In their study of the financial impacts of energy development in Colorado,
the Department of Local Affairs describes the "uniqueness of energy-
impacted boomtowns; and the following claim about the fixed and local
nature of energy development:
One additional unique characteristic of energy-impacted
boomtowns deserves mention. The development of energy
resources is site specific. An energy industry must go
where the natural resources are located--ther are very
few if any alternative locations.
It is sad that these models focus on the obvious problems facing
boomtowns, while failing to take stock of the structure and dynamics of
energy booms and, therefore, the more profound aspects of the boomtown
phenomenon. Local growth is taken to be motivated primarily by the demand
for and supply of labor, housing, and public and private capital stock in
the boom. Furthermore, the boom is understood to begin at the commence-
ment of construction, peak at the height of development, and bust at the
completion of operations. Of peripheral concern to models like these is
the possibility that the center of the boom sloshes around the region from
one area to another, or the case where there is no growth peak but instead
an upward slopping curve, or that the traditional spatial organization of
the regional economy becomes reorganized. (See Diagram II).
To be sure, many of the boom projection models in existence today
have evolved from studies of either mining operations or plant construction
projects, which clearly resemble the sine-curve pattern of growth they
invoke. But in the race to improve the power of their projection models,
the distinction between these types of booms and other booms has faded.
The study of the energy boomtowns has not graduated from its primary stage
of development where the classification of phenomena takes place.
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Nevertheless, it is already being promoted as an almost complete science.
For, when invoked, the term boomtown is meant to refer to all boomtowns.
It is not common in the literature to precede 'boomtowns' with such
caveats as coal or uranium or petroleum.
With the term energy boomtown being used with little qualification,
the planner in an oil boomtown may be led to apply the same planning
techniques for his situation that have been developed for, say, coal or
oil shale boomtowns. But as he or she will surely find out eventually,
what happens in those booms will not necessarily happen in an oil boom.
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THE PERMIAN BASIN
The Non-Human Environment
The term permian basin derives from the geological description of a
particular formation underlying central West Texas and the southeastern
corner of New Mexico. More specifically, 'permian' describes a particular
period of geological time, and it corresponds to the thickest layer of
rock found under the region. During the Permian Period, a sea was formed
there (hence the Permian Basin) and with the passing of eons, this ancient
sea dried up and was covered over with formations which developed mostly
during the Permian Period, but also during later periods. Since the
largest geological layer is from the Permian Period, most of the petro-
leum extracted from the Permian Basin is found between and within (the
distinction will come up later) permian structures. Very large deposits
of oil and gas have been found also in the structures of other periods how-
ever.
Life Without the Boom
The character of the world above the Permian Bsin can hardly be des-
cribed as having anything to do with a large body of water. Relative
to the surrounding regions, the Permian Basin is very arid. On the average,
it receives about fifteen inches of rainfall on its northern counties, five
inches on the central counties, and downward from ten inches on its southern
and southwestern counties.1
On an imaginary line that cuts roughly through the middle of the region
from northeast to sourtheast, the Southern Great Plains and the steps of the
Southern Rocky Mountains meet. In Andrews, Borden, Dawson, Gaines, Martin,
and Midland, the land is generally flat and covered with flora typical
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to the Great North American Prairie. Crane, Ector, Loving, Upton, Ward
and Winkler are characterized by desert-like features, such as rocky sur-
faces, craggy rills and barren rolling hills which in some places turn
into white sand dunes. The land is really only suitable for grazing in
these counties.2 The southern counties, Crockett, Pecos, and Reeves are
taken up mostly by sierras and dry inter-mesa flats. The Pecos River
trickles through this part of the Permian Basin, but since it is naturally
very salinated, it really gives no sustenance to the vegetation in the
area. In the eastern counties, Glasscock, Howard, Mitchell, Reagan,
Scurry and Sterling, the land is the most humid in the region. It is
drained by the northern reaches of the Colorado River (of Texas) and the
Concho River systems. The soil there is suitable for thick vegetation,
and thus it is the most cultivated part of the Permian Basin. 3 Before the
boom, this area was also the most populated are of the region.
Midland-Odessa
Midland City and Odessa are the places where oilmen in the region go
to hire the services of wildcatters, to take bids on the construction of
pipelines, to arrange for a trucking company to haul equipment andmaterials
to the oilfields, or simply to spend a wild weekend away from the sound of
drilling rigs. Every Monday morning, work crews drive out from Midland
City and Odessa and deseminate throughout the Permian Basin, sometimes
taking up to four hours to reach their actual job sites.
Midland City and, fifteen minutes away, Odessa make up the largest
population center between Dallas-Fort Worth and El Paso-Juares. In that
part of Texas, the major population and trading centers other than Midland-
Odessa are Lubbock, Abilene, and San Angelo (see Table III). Of these
three cities, the one closest in distance to either Midland City or Odessa
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is San Angelo, approximately three hours driving time away from Midland
City. Odessa is larger than San Angelo in terms of Population. Then, if
counted as one, Midland-Odessa add up to a larger population center than
Abilene. Only Lubbock, 140 miles north, is larger than Midland-Odessa.
Most of the consumers from the twenty-one counties in this paper,
shop in Midland-Odessa (see Table IV and V). About 55% of all wholesale,
61% of all manufacturing, and 45% of all retail establishments in the
Permian Basin are located in either Ector County or Midland County (see
Table VI). Of all the major market centers of significant size in South-
eastern New Mexico and West Texas, Midland-Odessa, with 274,600 consumers,
rank second only to Lubbock, with 372,300 consumers (see Table V).
The history of the region shows that Midland-Odessa has been one of
the fastest growing areas in the Permian Basin since the boom. From a
population of 2,407 in 1930, Odessa grew into a booming town of 89,797
people in 1980 (see Table III). During this same period, Midland increased
from 5,484 to 70,525 inhabitants. At different points in time, both cities
have experienced more than once a growth in population of more than 100%
(see Table II). Odessa virtually came on to the map as a full-fledged
city -- without having gone through any real infancy stages. In fact, in
1920, no more than 760 people were enumerated in all of Ector County. But
in 1940, it had become the second largest town in the Permian Basin, with
9,573 residents. By 1950, it was the largest city in the region with
29,495 people. Midland City went from a population of 1,795 in 1920 to
one of 5,484 people in 1930; and 9,352 people in 1940. By 1950, it had
surpassed Big Spring and was the second largest city in the region.
Big Spring, although it was the largest city in the Permian Basin at the
start of the boom and peaked at 31,320 inhabitants in 1960, today has only
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TABLE IV: Basic Trading Area, by County
County
Andrews
Borden
Crane
Crockett
Dawson
Ector
Gaines
Glasscock
Howard
Loving
Martin
Midland
Mitchell
Pecos
Reagan
Reeves
Scurry
Sterling
Upton
Ward
Winkler
Source:
Basic Trading Center
Midland-Odessa
Big Spring
Midland-Odessa
San Angelo
Lubbock
Midland-Odessa
Lubbock
Big Spring
Big Spring
Midland-Odessa
Big Spring
Midland-Odessa
Abilene
San Angelo
San Angelo
Midland-Odessa
Abilene
San Angelo
Midland-Odessa
Midland-Odessa
Midland-Odessa
1981 Commercial Atlas and Marketing
Guide. Rand McNally & Company, 1981
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TABLE V: Current Population and Sales Data for Basic Trading Area, 1980
Population
207,200Abilene
Big Spring
Lubbock
Midland-Odessa
San Angelo
NEW MEXICO
Carlsbad
Hobbs
Roswell
40,600
372,300
242,600
164,000
48,000
55,000
51,000
Households
77,500
14,700
127,100
83,200
60,000
17,100
19,100
17,900
Total
Retail
sales
($1,_000' s)
764,555
179,590
1,416,897
1,126,651
611,932
153,711
186,157
187,682
Shopping
goods
sales
($1,000's)
137,645
30,440
256,626
197,610
98,997
25,657
30,330
31,091
Source: 1981 Commercial Atlas
Company, 1981.
and Marketing Guide, Rand McNally and
TEXAS
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TABLE VI: Number of Business Establishments Registered, by
Andrews
Borden
Crane
Crockett
Dawson
Ector
Gaines
Glasscock
Howard
Loving
Martin
Midland
Mitchell
Pecos
Reagan
Reeves
Scurry
Sterling
Upton
Ward
Winkler
REGION
Total
Source:
Manufacturing
7
0
4
1
18
145
8
0
26
0
3
79
10
10
1
14
19
0
2
12
6
Wholesale
20
0
7
5
64
360
37
1
77
0
11
171
15
28
12
39
42
2
25
24
21
Retail
134
5
49
55
220
1104
157
10
458
1
37
736
108
200
42
209
231
15
78
174
114
Mineral
164
48
106
102
81
385
105
52
115
39
76
356
40
182
96
72
108
30
90
147
106
County, 1972
Number
Employed
In Minerals
1400
100
800
600
300
5000
8000
500
500
100
400
5000
100
2100
700
300
1100
Not
Available
600
1400
800
365 961 4137 2500
County and City Data Book, U.S. Department of Commerce (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).
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24,804 people and is the third largest city in the region. Thus of the
three largest cities in the Permian Basin, the largest town today used
to be one of the smallest communities in the whole region at the onset of
the boom, and the smallest of the top three cities today used to be the
largest town at the beginning.
What is perhaps the most outstanding thing about both Midland and
Odessa is, however, that neither Ector County nor Midland County are as
well endowed with petroleum as their position in the region seems to indi-
cate. The two largest petroleum fields in the Permian Basin, Yates and
Kelly-Snyder (respectively the fifth and eighth most productive fields
in the United States) are not located in or adjacent to Ector or Midland. 4
Although almost 52% of the entire population of the Permian Basin lives in
either Ector or Midland, but less than 25% of both the value added and the
total receipts from all mineral-related industries in the twenty-one coun-
ties (see Table VII). As for agriculture, the only economic activity in
the region which is not dependent on the petroleum boom for its sustenance,
has figured least significantly in Ector and Midland than in most of the
other counties in the region.5 This is consistent with the fact that the
land has always been the least arable in this area than most of the rest
of the Permian Basin.
Thus, in terms of the obvious economic bases that would seem to be
critical for a strong local economy there, Ector and Midland do not have
between them a clear advantage over the average county in the region.
Beyond the fact that they do serve as the point of rendezvous for the
petroleum industry in the region, a planner is left with no apparent
explanation for why these two counties out of all the rest have come to
assume the central position in the regional economy. A more complex
TABLE VII: Establishments, Employed and Transactions in Mineral Industry, by County, 1977
Petroleum Extraction
Total'
Establish-
ments
Crude
and
Gas
Number
Employed
(1,000's)
Establish-
ments with
20 or more
workers
1977
Other
Mineral
Industries
Capital
Value Expend-
Added ditures
1972
Value of
Shipments
Value and
Added Receipts
($1,000's) ($1,000's)
Andrews 164
Borden 42
Crane 114
Crockett 107
Dawson 80
Ector 341
Gaines 114
Glasscock 65
Howard 132
Loving 45
Martin 64
Midland 454
Mitchell 47
Pecos 167
Reagan 97
Reeves 78
Scurry 123
Sterling 49
Upton 104
Ward 148
Winkler 114
NA--not available.
Source: U.S. Census of Mineral
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36
57
69
45
89
66
42
83
30
41
268
30
93
60
41
52
32
57
61
67
0.8
1.0
1.2
0.3
1.0
6.8
0.6
0.1
0.8
0.1
0.2
6.3
4.0
1.7
0.7
0.7
1.5
0.2
0.7
0.3
0.9
10
1
21
2
3
19
10
2
2
1
4
61
3
20
10
7
23
3
14
21
16
0
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
8
0
21
2
40
0
0
3
6
1
0
3
4
430.0
73.7
381.8
132.4
83.0
721.2
424.0
38.3
120.1
117.0
67.9
309.4
51.2
837.8
83.6
180.9
435.3
39.4
136.7
245.3
237.2
55.7
4.9
48.1
48.1
15.2
125.6
56.9
21.2
19.5
14.1
16.0
76.4
10.5
98.1
17.1
30.5
25.0
11.1
25.6
38.5
28.9
238.1
0
183.7
48.9
39.1
353.9
107.6
8.8
54.3
13.3
33.0
125.9
13.0
276.9
30.3
46.9
323.1
NA
0.6
0.2
0.8
282.0
35.6
228.6
58.6
46.3
430.5
127.9
9.9
64.4
10.4
41.2
159.0
15.5
341.3
52.4
47.6
368.7
NA
77.2
136.0
101.6
Industries.
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explanation must lie in the development process of the petroleum boom.
The question that arises here is, how could anybody have predicted at the
onset, that the boom would leave the regional economy organized this way?
Could the planner have known that Midland City and Odessa and not, say,
Big Spring, or Midland and Big Spring, or the combination of any other two
or more communities, or soley Midland or Odessa, would experience the main
thrust of the boom?
If at the start of the oil boom in the early 1920's, had planners
applied theboom models that have been developed for other forms of energy
resources development, many communities other than Midland City and Odessa
might have been advised to gear up for an eminent increase in demand for
housing, social services, infrastructure and other public and private
forms of capital stock. The older agriculatural towns like Colorado City,
Pyote, Snyder, and Wink would have been prompted by the Texas state and
United States federal government to invest heavily in roads, water and
sewer mains, and extra public service personnel, only to sadly find out
later that instead of coming to them the oil industry was locating in
the new town of Odessa or in the relatively insignificant community of
Midland City. Ambitious private developers might have risked fortunes in
order to construct residential and office space in time to wring profits
from the incoming workers and service oriented firms. In Midland City,
for example, private developers completed a twelve-story office building --
a rarity in th-e region before the 1960's -- in 1929, thinking that
surely a lot of business from the oilfields would pass through Midland. 6
As it turned out, after a brisk period of growth, the Petroleum Building
was idle during the 1930's. Colorado City, after two decades of fast
growth, ended up in 1950 with only 2,000 new residents (see Diagram II).
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Snyder, after having grown by 1,000 people every ten years from 1929 to
1940, and having leaped to 12,010 people in 1950, saw no more growth.
As for Pyote and Wink, along with McKamey and other smaller boomtowns,
they declined in population after the first decade of the boom.
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PROJECTING THE OIL BOOM
A rationalistic view of how populations settle in a region do.es
not explainwhat occured in the Permian Basin. For the method of operation
in petroleum development allows the worker-consumer neither a clear pic-
ture of the costs and benefits involved in location nor a promise of
where the market center will be for him or her in the future. Since
workers do not know where their jobs will be in the future, they cannot
calculate where to settle in order to cut transportation costs, how to en-
hance their employment opportunities, or where to make other types of trade-
offs between their residential location and the location of their jobs. The
planner who projects the spatial development of region experiencing an
oil boom based upon what exists before the boom, or upon the immediate
needs and actions of the workers-consumer will not be much better off
than the roughneck who has to move on to a new location when the oilfield
"matures."
What follows is a study of four different categories and hypotheses
which the planner might have been tempted to use to predict the pattern
developed of the boom:
1. The Most Outstanding and Established Population Centers.
2. Corners of the Regional Economy
3. Crossroads, Mid-points and Hotspots of the Oilfields
4. Most Promising Geological Factors
The methods of analysis will be that of first recreating the scenario that
the hypothesis seems to paint, and then presenting the actual outcome
according to history.
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The Established Population Centers?
Hypothetical. In the findings from their study on the impacts from
the development of coal, uranium, and petroleum in New Mexico, the
Governor's Energy Impact Task Force (EITF) offered the following obser-
vations as characteristic of all energy boomtowns in the state:
1) one of more energy based project is planned within com-
muting distance of the town; (2) the total of construction,
,operating and local service employees coming into the
community causes a significant population increase; (3) the
present population base is less than 50,000; (4) the
economic base of the community becomes heavily dependent
on the new energy based project; (5) the community's need
to provide public services and facilities go far beyond
their financial and managerial resources; (6) critically
important public facilities, such as water and sewer systems,
cannot be readily expanded to accomodate anticipated growth;
(7) a serious shortage of permanent and mobile housing
develops; (8) school classroom capacity becomes ingdequate
to handle the additional load. (Managing the Boom)
Having put them forth, EITF proceeds with the rest of the report to
describe in detail how the regional boom shows up in each of the eight
characteristics above. Given this approach to the question of boomtowns,
it follows that the most growth should occur in those communities that
are best able to meet the needs of the incoming population. The incoming
workforce will choose to settle where they can find the best accomodations
within driving distance of their jobs. They will settle in the communi-
ties that have the largest stock of housing and public infrastructure,
along with the most complete service sector. All the existing housing
stock will immediately be taken at the beginning of the boom, regardless
of the size of the community. But as time goes on and shortages start
to develop, the people who are left out will tend to look first at the
largest population and economic centers in the vicinity of their job sites.
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A larger town means a higher probability of accommodation than in
a smaller town. Although the housing turnover rate in the big town may
be no higher than that of a smaller town, the absolute number of vacancies
can be higher. Even if an opening cannot be found outright, there may
still be a greater chance in the large towns of finding people who are
willing to share their shelters with new arrivals through boarding or
house-sharing arrangements, or by building and renting new house addi-
tions or trailer space.
Then once absolutely all the existing housing opportunities have been
taken, those in-migrants who decide to build homes will tend to build
them in the larger towns. In the short-term, the workers who come with
families will prefer to drive longer distances than settle in relative
wilderness. In the smaller towns they will see fewer of filling stations,
movie theatres, and other forms of recreation outlets. The streets will
be less likely to be paved. The capacity of water and sewer and other
utility mains will be suited for a smaller population size; hence growth
will be limited.
Large towns will have, furthermore, an advantage over the smaller
towns with regards to the provision and expansion of their public
infrastructure. They enjoy in their present state support from a larger
tax base and a greater enconomy of scale in infrastructure. A given lump
sum of capital required for say, the construction of a new water-treating
plant, itcanbe borne more easily by a greater number of taxpayers than
by fewer taxpayers. Also,given a rapid increase in demand for such infra-
structure as streets, power lines, and water mainsi the existing stock
serving a big town can service more new people than can that of a small
town. The crowding threshold in a larger system is greater in a large
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town than in a smaller town. In a small town where the volume of traffic
is relatively small, a system of unpaved residential streets may be the
most appropriate, most cost-effective way for the municipality to meet
the need of its constituency. It pays the local residents to bear the
costs of gradual wear on their vehicles and to support a tractor and a
driver to scrape the streets very other month, than to pay for paved
streets which will not be used at near their capacity levels. But if
traffic increases to the point where the roads deteriorate more frequently
and the tractor has to be called out every other week and after even
brief showere's, then it will be more efficient to pave the streets. Once
the streets are paved, the asphalt will make them wear better. Then only
a truly fantastic increase in traffic will tax the town's street system
in a way that will force the city to take further measurers to meet the
community's needs in the area of streets. Other than build more streets
or regulate traffic in some way, there is not much more that can be done
in this area, however. In any case, the larger communities should have
more options in this regard. The smaller communities will have fewer
options in the short-term because they will still be at the point of
paving streets or adding on to Main Street--that is, the only paved
street in town.
Large cities have a further advantage with regards to the expansions
of public capital, since they do not have to start from scratch. A large-
scale or small-scale power line or a water main system of a given design
can service a large or small population. For example, a gridded system
of power lines can have Y grids of poles and lines suppored by X central
(main) highwire lines which bring in power from the regional electrical
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generating station. Y can increase until X can no longer carrry enough
power to support them, or until they begin to veer away from the layout
of the central pylons. The same principle applies to other forms of
public capital, such as water and sewer systems, gas lines, and streets.
The cost of installing another domestic utility line of standard dimen-
sions to the main can be borne by the individual consumer who orders it.
But if demand increases to the point where water pressure or power begins
to decline, or where the length of domestic lines conneting to the mains
has increased beyond what the consumer can afford, the community as a
whole will have to put up the capital to lay a new main extension.
Construction will have to proceed in the directions which the existing
layout of mains does not head. The town administrators will now have to
overcome new financial, political and physical obstacles. The hill at
the outskirts of town which the Water Department people had been avoiding
will now have to be scaled and water pumped up to the growing number of
people who have built new homes on it. The town will finally have to
declare some downtown property public domain in order to open up right-of-
ways for the installation of the new mains.
In the face of all these costs, the small towns will delay expansion,
and this will inturn hold back residential construction. Growth, in
general, will be capped at the existing levels of infrastructure and other
capital stock. After a while, people will stop looking toward the smaller
towns and begin to settle in the cities. The cities, on the other hand,
have the advantage of offering developers more options for adding on to
the city at lower costs to city's taxpayers. Since utility mains will be
available in greater capacities and will probably run more directions,
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crowding will be less noticeable. The city administrators will have more
time and more manueverability with which to meet a slower rate of deter-
ioration in services and per capita infrastructure.
Outcome. Nevertheless, for all the insights into savings incentives
and cost barriers that this view of regional boom development holds, it
does not recreate what happened in the Permian Basin during the 1930's
and 1940's. The towns that experiencE the most growth during that period
were not then the largest population centers nor the most outstanding
economic centers. On the eve of the oil boom, Ector and Midland were
not siginificant in the distribution of population and economic activities
in the region. It is hard to imagine how people would have preferred
either of these two counties over all the others in the region on account
of their existing capacity to accomodate growth.
In 1920 neither Ector nor Midland amounted to anything of a signifi-
cant population center in the region. Together they accounted for no more
than 6.5% of the total population, 9.5% being the random share for each
county (1/21 + 1/21). Ector, with a population of 760, stood well below
the median population count, 1053, for all the counties in 1920, and it
was a little more than one and a half (1.688) standard deviations from the
mean, 2350. (See Table I) Midland, with 2449 people, was but an average
county in terms of population size. Odessa was not incorporated until .
1928. Midland City, which was incorporated by 1920 had only 1975 residents,
third behind Big Spring (Howard County) and Snyder (Scurry County).
By 1930, the region had increased by 261.4% and thirty-five major
oilfields had been proved throughout the Permian Basin. Three of these
fields straddled the Ecotr-Crane County line, but still it did not seem
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that people were wanting to settle in Ector or Midland over other areas in
the region. Ector and Midland even then amounted to no more than 9.4% of
the total population, about equal to the random distribution for any two
counties. If anything, it seems that in 1930 in-migrants were preferring
several other counties than either Ector or Midland. Individually, Howard,
Mitchell, Dawson, and Scurry had, in order, 17.9%, 11.1%, 10.6%, and 9.5%,
of the population. All of these counties touch the Howard County line.
Thus including Borden County, which is situated above Howard between Dawson
and Scurry, it can be said at that time that more than 50% of the popula-
tion of the region had settled in the northeastern area.
In 1930 Big Spring had swelled by 68% to 13,735 inhabitants.
Colorado City (Mitchell County) stood at 4671 inhabitants; Lamesa
(Dawson County) at 3528; and Snyder at 3008. Odessa by that time had
2407 people, and Midland City had 5484 people. As such, Midland was the
second largest city in the region. Odessa, however, ranked tenth. From
the point of view of tax sharing and economies of scale, Midland City was
not the clear first choice for developers and newly arrived workers look-
ing to build a new house in the region. Big Spring, thirty-five miles
northeast of Midland City, was most probably the best competitor in this
regard. Odessa, twenty miles west of Midland City, could not have been
very competitive. Not only did it rank very low in terms of population
size, but it was also situated closely between two larger communities;
namely, Midland City and Wink (Winkler County). A worker arriving from
outside the region who did not want to live in Big Spring would have
looked to settle in Midland or Wink before Odessa, since even ten years
into the boom it still showed no obvious signs of being able to provide
either shelter or savings to any outstanding scale.
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To be sure, there was not much to look at in the way of housing
stock in Ector at the beginning of the boom (See Table VIII). In 1920
there were only 173 dwellings in Ector. Midland had 526 dwellings. On
the other hand, immediately southest of Ector, Ward County had 548 dwell-
ings. Driving through Texas from Dallas to El Paso in the early 1920's
one would hardly have known that the stretch of land between Midland City
and Monahans was inhabited. In fact, the whole strip running from north
to south through Ector (Gaines, Andrews, Ector, Crane and Upton) was
relatively devoid of man-made structures during the 1920's. There only
555 dwellings in that five-county strip, accounting for 5.3% of the total
stock--although it takes up almost one third of the total land surface
in the Permian Basin (See Map II).
The number of dwellings gives no positive indication of the true
relative attractiveness of Ector among new arrivals to the region. For
there is the question of critical mass of housing, of comparative worth
among all the dwellings enumerated, etc. But what can be grasped with
this statistic is the panorama that faced the newly arrived worker and
developer. The region having increased by 61.6% between 1920 and 1930,
there must have been alot of hasty settlement decisions made by the new
arrivals. Keeping in mind that most of the housing stock in the region
was located in the northeastern counties, a planner studying the impacts
of energy development on the region could not possibly have guessed that
Odessa would come to matter very much to the development of the region.
One would have thought that most of the impact would be felt where there
already were more people and where there appeared to be a longer history
of development, and most of this was in the northeastern counties and
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TABLE VIII: Number of Dwellings 1920-1950, by County
Andrews
Borden
Crane
Crockett
Dawson
Ector
Gaines
Glasscock
Howard
Loving
Martin
Midland
Mitchell
Pecos
Reagan
Reeves
Scurry
Sterling
Upton
Ward
Winkler
Source: U.S. Census
1920
78
199
7
362
884
173
231
131
1390
21
242
526
1480
904
71
995
1834
237
66
548
24
of Housi
1930
193
323
745
659
2848
853
607
293
4766
54
1188
1714
3042
1746
840
1400
2603
335
1510
1092
1970
ng.
1940
407
366
903
770
4606
4677
2548
399
5892
97
1514
3576
3704
2120
585
2232
3313
406
1424
2969
2088
1950
1692
332
1309
1281
6091
13,358
2885
359
8243
74
1963
8194
4436
2962
1098
3506
7409
442
1765
4171
3265
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Howard.
In terms of their local economy, Midland and Ector did not seem to
be outstanding either. Well into the boom in 1930 the Permian Basin had
acquired workforce of 45,802 people. Of these workers, 2967 and 1635
lived in Midland and Ector respectively. In Dawson, Mitchell, Pecos,
Scurry and Winkler, however, there were 4263; 4557; 32,946; 3863 and 3090
workers respectively. Howard was by far the busiest employment center,
with 8552 workers. Surely, at the onset of the boom, Big Spring would
have been most people's guess as to where the epicenter of the boom
would be. After Big Spring planners would have looked toward counties
like Mitchell where the first oilwell in the region was completed or to
Winkler where a disproportionate number of oilfields had by then been
discovered and where one of the largest towns in the region was located.
Midland, since it did not have oil but did have the second largest urban
population and the sixth largest workforce, might have received a
corresponding amount of attention from planners. But Ector, the 12th
largest workforce, with one of the smallest communities in the region,
would not have been diagnosed as an area about to be heavily impacted by
oil boom had planners based their projections on the existing distribution
of population, housing stock and agglomeration of public capital stock.
Based on these variables, one would have predicted that Big Spring would
remain, and if anything, increased its position as the center of the
regional economy.
Corners of the Regional Economy?
Hypothetical. Would it have been correct to expect that growth would
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occur where there was specialization in the oilfield service sectors?
The argument here is that the oil companies found in Ector and Midland
some form of oil-related expertise which for one reason or another could
not be found in the other counties. That for this reason the oil
industry patronized Ector and Midland more than the other local eonomies,
thereby concentrating there the boom's demand for labor and service.
The oilfield service areas which come to mind in order for the argument
above to hold are primarily five:
1. Transportation
2. Warehousing
3. Welding and Oilfield Construction
4. Miscellaneous Business Services
5. Public Utilities
Outcome. Several facts contradict the argument that between them
Ector and Midland had cornered any of these five areas, however. Firstly,
the petroleum industry could not have purchased very many services from
a small local economy like the one that existed in Ector and Midland in
the 1920's and 1930's. The oil industry has always been a capital inten-
sive industry. Perhaps more labor was used in the oilfields in the 1930's
but certainly fewer services were employed in the oilfields because it is
only recently that new technologies have begun to enter into the produc-
tion picture in a significant way. By far the largest expense that the
oil industry makes toward production goes toward meeting property and
mineral rights obligations (e.g. lease payments, royalty payments, con-
tract bonuses, etc.). (See Table IX) Even by the 1970's when secondary
and tertiary recovery technologies and other more capital intensive
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TABLE IX: Commodity-by-Industry
Direct Requirements
Commodity
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas
Maintenance and Repair Construction
Primary Iron and Steel Manufacturing
Construction and Mining Machinery
Electrical industrial Equipment and apparatus
Transportation and Warehousing
Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
Finance and Insurance
Real Estate and Rental
Business Services
Compensation of Employees
Property-type Income
Crude, Petroleum and
Natural Gas Industry
.03346
.04123
.00658
.00660
.00681
.00605
.01321
.00636
.15222
.02209
.11930
.47695
Source: The Input-Output Structure of the U.S. Economy, 1972, U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1979.
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production techniques were introduced, it was still estimated that
approximately 48 cents on every dollar put into production went to cover
property right costs. After property rights, the largest expense is
incurred with real estate and rental services, fifteen cents on every
dollar. Third in order is employee compensation, approximately twelve
cents. This is to say that at least 75% of the petroleum industry's
costs in inputs are made in areas which could not have been unique to
any single county. The remaining 25% of purchases by the oil industry
are divided among the many other producers in the economy. The hilghest
oilfield-related service on the list is maintenance and repair construc-
tion which receives only four cents on every dollar. Thus for being such
a small factor of production, oilfield services and all forms of service
in general does not mean very much to the petroleum industry. Several
other things matter much more. The two most prized factors, mineral
rights and labor were clearly not cornered nor most abundant in Ector or
Midland at the beginning of the boom. On the contrary, at that time they
seemed to be located elsewhere in the Permian Basin. By 1930 almost all
of the new oilfields were located in the northeastern and southwestern
counties. As for labor, the nature of the boom is such that the demand
for labor is met by an outside workforce who comes into the region. And
telling simply from the relatively low number of people that already
lived or seemed headed to Ector and Midland in 1920 and 1930, it seems
that labor was less abundant there then in other areas of the Permian
Basin.
Could there existed some special function of production in
Ector or Midland which the oil industry sought out no matter if it
50
was a tiny part of the overall cost of production? It is highly unlikely
that this situation existed. For, ten years into the boom, Ector and
Midland had comparatively fewer people who were engaged in oil-
field activities. (See Table X) Ector had 361 oilfield workers, 6.9% of
the total. Midland had 147 such workers, 2.8% of the total. On the
other hand, Winkler alone had 1283 oilfield workers, which accounted for
24.6% of the total workforce; Pecos, with 785 oilfield workers, had 15%
of the total; and Howard, with 698 oilfield workers, had 13.4% of the
total. In fact there were six counties that had more people employed
in the oilfields than Ector. If there was a pattern of technical
agglomeration and specialization in the region during the first decade
of the boom, the local oilfield workforce totals would have indicated
that Ector and Midland played a very minor role in that pattern.
The argument from agglomeration of oilfield factors and
services, rather than pointing to Odessa and Midland City, would have
led the planner to look away from that part of the region. Then had the
communities invested their resources in the hope that growth would occur
in their vicinity because there was an abundant supply of experienced
oilfield labor, some of the smallest counties today would have met a sad
fate.
The Mid-Point or Hot Spots of the Oilfields
Hypothetical: A more farsighted view of the boom would have been to
expect settlement during the boom to proceed in a way that would maximize
everybody's access to (or alternatively, that would minimize travel time
between) all the "hot spots" in the oilfields. In this way, after having
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TABLE X: Persons 10 Years and over Engaged in Gainful Occupations
by selected Industry Groups for Counties, 1930
Andrews
Borden
Crane
Crockett
Dawson
Ector
Gaines
Glasscoc
Howard
Loving
Martin
Midland
Pecos
Reagan
Reeves
Scurry
Sterling
Upton
Ward
Winkler
Total
Employed
212
512
895
906
4263
1635
802
k 424
8552
91
1791
2967
2946
1191
2272
3863
587
2409
1787
3090
Source: U.S. Census of Population,
Agricul
140
458
30
352
2693
166
525
272
1772
12
1216
931
769
150
605
2175
316
116
466
33
1930.
Oil and
ture Gas
26
3
491
46
10
361
9
38
698
45
15
147
785
417
64
25
4
396
178
1283
Wholesale
and Retail
17
4
81
73
340
163
58
6
847
5
94
279
184
77
240
267
35
254
183
307
RANK
Total Oil and
Employment Gas
20 15
18 21
15 4
14 12
3 18
12 7
16 19
19 14
1 3
21 13
10 17
6 10
7 2
13 5
9 11
4 16
17 20
8 6
11 8
5 1
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started off in the oilfield or truckstops in Mitchell, then having moved
to Crane, then later to Pecos and Winkler, the incoming workers eventually
move to settle in Midland-Odessa. From either of these two points they
could commute to the job site almost anywhere in the Permian Basin,
instead of constantly relocating everytime the drilling rate dropped off.
Similarly, the drilling firms, welding and tooling outfits, the trucking
companies, the "roustabout" crews, etc., decided to locate their terminals
in Midland City or Odessa in an effort to cut their transportation and
maintenance costs. Retailers and wholesalers and the non-oilfield service
sectors, upon seeing a crossroads emerging, moved to Midland-Odessa, too.
Outcome. Conceivably, while planning for a long-term, all the
actors might have seen a greater benefit in starting out from scratch in
the small town of Midland City or in Odessa instead of locating in, say,
Fort Stockton (Pecos County) or Lamesa (Dawson County) or Colorado City
(Mitchell County). All three of these towns are situated on the periphery
of the Permian Basin. In 1920 and 1930 they were all bigger than Odessa
and approximately the same size as Midland City, and they were located
in or adjacent to one of the clusters of new oilfields. However, they
all stood on the opposite end of the region from the other clusters.
(See Exhibits D,E,F, Appendix). From there they were slowly cut off from
the mainstream of activity in the region as a whole. Then when the number
of annual well completions fell locally, employment went down, and growth
was stunted. The workers and service managers who had located in these
towns found they were no longer living in a "hot spot" in the oil industry.
Other hot spots had developed in the other corners of the region, but
because of the transportation costs and because of their relative
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isolation from the networks of information, the people in Fort Stockton,
Snyder, and Colorado City were cut off from the new developments in the
region.
A further question arises with respect to the several communities in
the central counties of the region. How could anybody have anticipated
which of these communities would be the most eligible from the point of
view of minimizing travel time? When was it time to settle? When was it
time to ride out the lull in the oilfields?
Through the 1920's thirty-seven new fields were opened up througout
the Permian Basin, but it was not until 1931 that oil was struck in Ector
County. (See Table XI) No oil at all was found in Midland and until
the late 1940's. In Crane, immedidtely south of Ector, five fields were
discovered by the 1930. Immediately southwest of Ector, Ward County also
saw five new fields by 1930. Directly above Ward and bordering Ector,
Winkler County had three new fields by 1930. Each of these counties
could have been a hot spot from the point of view of the planner. In
terms of oilfield activity they were at the very least as hot as Ector,
and they all stood the same distance from each other--that is from each
other's oilfields. (See Exhibits D,E,F, Appendix).
Nevertheless, these counties did not grow as much as Ector. Although
it was connected to the same highway that runs through Odessa from
Lubbock, Crane saw very little sustained growth. The same happened in
Ward, which is connected to the same inter-state highway that runs through
Odessa and Midland and Big Spring. Ward County had a higher population
than Ector ten years before during and ten years into the boom. The num-
ber of people in Ward almost doubled from 1920 to 1930, and from 1930 to
TABLE XI: Number of New Fields Discovered, 1915-1944, by CQunty
1915-1924
1925-1934
1935-1944
Total
Double
Counting
0 0 0 0 M CD 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 -00 0 00
4- c-7 42 0 0 W C) (1 CL 01 3 (1) 0 t 6(3 0 ) 7 0-4
14(- C 0 0 1 1 1 1 () V 0 1 6 1 8 0 1 9(1) 0 0-
-- A1 =- U) Mi -) -"i C 0 X- CD MD C
MD M.( inC 5 i) C) (A CD M :
:5-'L 0 C-t (A
C) cf
4 7 4(2) 0 0 0 1 10 (1) 0 0 1 3 (1 ) 0 6(3) 0 1 7 0 4
14(11 8 0 0 1 1 1 16 (1) 0 0 1 6 1 8 3(1) 1 11 9(1) 0 10
19 15 6 0 1 1 3 26 3 0 0 2 9 2 8 13 1 12 17 0 14
(-) plus fields which straddle boundary from another county
Source: U.S. Crude Oil
Total not
Double
Counting
2
47
91
140/153
Data 1866-1944 (Compiled by the Petroleum Administration for War
I) National Petroleum Council 1970.
I 1
U'
1945, Vol. II,
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1940. But in 1940 Ward was behind Ector by almost 5000 people--Ward
having started with 2615 people and Ector with 760 people.
Winkler, although for a while it boomed more than any county in
its vicinity, also fell rapidly behind Ector in the 1930's and 1940's.
(See Table II). What is most remarkable about the case of Winkler is,
however, that above Winkler in New Mexico, Lea County was also in the
midst of an oil boom. Thus unlike Ector, which was bordered by an "oil-
less" county, Midland, Winkler was (and still is) surrounded on all sides
by big oil-producing counties. The fact aside that by 1930 alot more
oil producing activities were occuring in Winkler than Ector, Winkler
was always a crossroads in the oilfields. Workers and service firms
based in Winkler would have had an advantageous access to all oilfield
activity in that area. Nevertheless, after having boomed from 81 people
in 1920 to 6784 people in 1930, Winkler's population count went on to
6141 in 1940.
From the perspective of strategic access to oilfield activity, the
people moving to Ector in 1920's and early 1930's would have been an
anomaly. At best their settlement decisions would have seemed temporary
in scope, since most of the activity appeared to be occuring in the
counties neighboring Ector. But as it turned out, this trend continued
until Ector was the county with the largest population, although the
comparable oil-worthness of Ector in that area never changed.
Geological Factors?
Hypothetical. Possibly what caused to a great extent the redirection
of oilfield activity away from Howard and the northeastern counties toward
56
MAP IV: Regional Geology
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Ector and the western counties was the emergence of a definite pattern
of oil strikes.
Over time, more oilfields were being opened in the western counties
than in the eastern counties. It turns out that Ector and Midland sit
above a unique geological formation within the Permian Basin. (See Map
IV) The nature of the geology underlying Ector and Midland is such that
it is easier to find petroleum there than the rest of Permian Basin.
This explains the greater frequency of strikes in the strip of counties
between Andrews and Pecos. However, even with this insight it would have
been unfair to pick Odessa over all the other communities on that strip
as the community that was going to be most impacted by the oil boom.
As Robert R. Wheeler explains, oil is not where you find it, but "how
you find it."16  Beneath Ector from the floor of the Permian Basin there
protrudes what is known as a structural uplift. This uplift, named the
Central Basin Platform, begins approximately from the southcentral part
of the region and traverses northwest across the basin into Southeastern
New Mexico.17
The interesting thing about this formation is that it provides
oil prospectors with what are still the best conditions for predicting
the existence and location of oil and gas. Within the geological domain
of Central Basin Platform are buried a countless number of oil and gas
deposits in what are known as structural traps. These structural traps
look like big or small ripples (domes or anticlines) in the layered pro-
file of the ground. This feature allows for them to be located by
studying the structural character of the entire region. In the early
1900's this was done by studying the geological features of the surface
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and by analyzing the drilled core samples from different depths through-
out the region. What is also ideal about platform formations like the
Central Basin Platform is that the more it is drilled into, the more is
known about the whereabouts of its petroleum deposits. A region suspected
of containing pretroleum will be drilled into many times, at many differ-
ent depths and in many different areas. Information accumulates for the
region over time. Thus as time passes and exploration crews, wild-
catters,and development drillers continue to drill into areas, more and
more structural traps of all sizes are found.
There is another type of petroleum trap which forms quite differently
than structural trap; namely, stratigraphic traps. Stratigraphic traps
are formed when two strata (structural layers) shift and through the
friction "pinch out" and localize the oil which may be saturating the
area of the friction. These traps leave little or no profile or relief
for oilmen to trace. They are discovered through a random and costly
exploration process in which wildcats are sunk in what is really a hit or
miss fashion.19
It follows, therefore, that stratigraphic fields are both less com-
mon and on the average larger than structural oilfields. For the smaller
of these "obscure and subtle traps" are hidden even farther away, and
usually only the largest stratigraphic traps are found. 20  At
least nine of the largest oilfields in the Permian Basin are stratigraphic
traps. The largest field there today, Kelly-Snyder (Scurry, Mitchell and
Howard Counties), is contained in a stratigraphic trap.
The Central Basin Platform does not run under Howard and the north-
eastern or eastern counties, where the first two oil wells were struck.
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This is not to say that the fields there are predominately stratigraphic,
nor that the oil industry has ever seen less potential in the east than
elsewhere in the Permian Basin. Rather, what should be understood here
is that over the long-term oil tended to be found more frequently on and
around the two platforms than in the eastern part of the region. This
means that although the first oil strike was made in Mitchell, and
although there were sporadic strikes in Howard, Dawson, Glasscock and
Scurry, more fields tended to be found in the counties resting on top
of the two platforms. (See Exhibits, D,E,F, in Appendix), In fact,
the top five counties with the most oil fields by 1944 were, in order,
Pecos, Winkler, Ward, Crane and Ector. And all of these counties rest
on top of the Central Basin Platform. (See Table XI)
Outcome. Could this information have helped point out the new growth
centers? Or, could it have signalled that Big Spring or the communities
in the vicinity of Midland City and Odessa would not experience sustained
rapid growth? No.
The Central Basin Platform underlies at least seven counties. The
planner studying the situation to find which of them would be impacted
would have had to turn back to the other hypotheses for projecting the
boom. Seven counties still encompass enough space and demography to
make the matter of prediction as uncertain as prediction without geolo-
gical factors. With what was known about the region's geological features,
the planner still would have been deciding between Wink, Crane and
Monahans--not necessarily Odessa. Moreover, at the beginning of the boom,
the Central Basin Platform only had as much oil as was known about up un-
til that time. The fields that were found there in the 1940's may have
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been easier to find or larger in size than the fields in the eastern
counties. (See Table XII) But in the 1920's and 1930's when the
first exploration crews sunk their bits into the region, the deposits of
the Central Basin Platform could not have been too much easier to locate
than those of the eastern counties. It was only after operations had
been taking palce for many years that a patern began to emerge. The
ultimate question in an oil boom can only now be answered with the
benefit of hindsight: since the fact of the formation does not guarantee
the existance of oil, is there or is there not oil under the ground where
the well is being drilled--is Big Spring the best place to settle?
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TABLE XII: Ultimate Maximum Yielded Indicated, Aggregated by County,
(1000's Barrels)
15-24
Andrews
Borden
Crane
Crockett
Dawson
Ector
Gaines
Glasscock
Howard
Loving
Martin
Midland
Mitchell
Pecos
Reagan
Reeves
Scurry
Sterling
Upton
Ward
Winkler
Source: U.S. Crude Oil
Administration
Data 1866-1944 (Compiled by the Petroleum
for War 1945, Vol. II,I) National Petro-
leum Council, 1970.
1944
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1600
0
119029
0
0
0
99052
0
0
25-34
75540
0
583635
14400
0
512213
0
0
206500
18780
0
0
0
1504233
1000
0
0
0
0
189787
285710
34-44
199100
0
37355
26071
100
116083
706991
3780
5840
1120
0
0
0
56820
64000
4
11000
0
0
28248
437601
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CONCLUSION
Summary
The local impacts of a regional oil boom cannot be projected with
labor and local consumer markets as the only independent variables.
Petroleum development can be a highly mobile and random process, and
the center or concentration of activities in the region will tend to
shift from one cluster of oilfields to another. As wildcatters, pipe-
liners and roustabouts move from one completed field to a newly discovered
field, so too the epicenter of the boom will move from one area to another
as job locations are moved and the suppliers of consumer goods and
services shift in pursuit of a better crossroads for economic activity.
In the Permian Basin at the beginning of the boom the most impact
was felt among the established communities who stood closest to the new
fields. Since the first strikes were made in the eastern counties of the
region, Colorado City and Snyder experienced a lot of growth. Big Spring
boomed the most since it was the regional trade center before the
discovery of oil in the region. Later, oil was found in the western
counties, and the impacts of the boom started landing on the communities
of those counties as well. But as time went on, oilfields were discovered
in the western counties and more frequently than in the east. With this
the eastern towns saw no more rapid growth, and in the west growth
narrowed down to only a few communities. Some communities there waned,
while other increased tremendously in population.
True to the nature of the act itself, when new fields were first
being opened in the counties of the Central Basin Platform there was no
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indication that Odessa would grow as much as it did, nor that communities
like Pyote or Wink or McKamey would lose population. Nevertheless, as
the regional boom matured, Midland-Odessa became the growth center and
replaced Big Spring as the regional trade center. In fact, the entire
regional distribution of population before the boom was reorganized, no
matter the convenience of the old settlement scheme and no matter that it
all had to be started from scratch.
So What?
Although the four hypothese tested in this paper do not jibe with
what is now known about the region, it cannot really be said that the
outcome of a regional oil boom is definitly unpredictable. As the Law
of Undecideability agrues, given anV*Iunresolved problem, one is unable
to decide if the difficulty lies in one's lack of training or investment
of time in the problem, or if the problem by nature is unsolvable. The
case can always be made that with more time or the benefit of some future
enlightenment in the sciences, planners will someday be abt to
accurately predict the outcome of an oil boom. No doubt, future research
will yield interesting and useful insights into the matter. In the mean
time, however, it should suffice the planner to know that predicting local
growth in an oil boom is a very, very risky proposition. Understanding
this, the task of planning in an oil boom becomes more an exercise in
managging and strategizing in the midst of uncertainty, than an exercise
in putting form on all the random variables contributing to the boom.
Instead of charting the river, the planner should develop ways for staying
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afloat in the rapids if and when they come.
The costs and benfits of a boom do not have to be taken as given.
It may be preferable to follow the traditional Community's perference in-
spite of or until the boom is guaranteed. For the town stands to be
impacted if and only if business activities intensify in the vincinity and
the incoming workforce decides to locate precisely in one's town. And it
may happen that neither of these determining factors materializes.
Then if the oil boom does come and catches the community unprepared,
it may still be preferable to bear the immediate impacts and keep the
doors closed to the most transcient elements of the incoming population
through discriminating tax codes and regulations and by not increasing
the stock of public capital very much beyond what was projected before
the boom. In this way, an early test is made of the local boom--whether
or not it will remain there--and the temporary epicenter of the boom is
deferred to a neighboring town. As a result, the local community avoids
long-term disruption while still avialing itself the benefits of the job
opportunities and business brought in by the boom.
In West Texas, Monahans serves as the case in point. Although it was
surrounded by oil strikes at a very early date, it has managed to grow at
a manageable rate. Nonetheless, its people have found well-paying jobs in
the surrounding oilfields. And with Odessa booming only thirty-five miles
away, the community has access to the conveniences of having the regional
market center even though they never made any major accomodations for
growth and change.
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Exhibit B: Oil Pipeline and Production Areas
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Exhibit C: Natural Gas Pipel ine
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Exhibit E: Cumulative Distribution of New Fields
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